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INTRODUCTION
Our topic is the “bounds on executive discretion.” A number of the
articles assume, implicitly or explicitly, that there are two principal bounds:
law and politics. Yet another subset of the articles—a partly overlapping
subset—illustrates, implicitly or explicitly, that there is also a distinct third
bound on executive discretion: conventions, roughly understood as unwritten
but obligatory rules of the political game.1
I will argue that conventions pervasively shape and constrain executive
discretion and are an indispensable tool for understanding the issues
discussed in the articles. Debates among legal academics over executive
† John H. Watson Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. Prepared in conjunction with the
University of Pennsylvania Law Review Symposium on “The Bounds of Executive Discretion in the
Regulatory State” on October 16-17, 2015. Thanks to Nick Bagley for helpful comments.
1 For a more precise definition and analysis of conventions, see generally Adrian Vermeule,
Conventions of Agency Independence, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1163 (2013). I will assume that analysis as
background here.
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discretion misfire if and when the role of conventions is overlooked or
misunderstood. In particular, legal debates over executive discretion should
take account of three distinctions: (1) between contingent politics and
conventions; (2) between intragovernmental conventions and extragovernmental
conventions; and (3) between conventions against doing things and
conventions against saying things. The last distinction, in particular,
illuminates the strong resistance, in contexts such as immigration, to
executive policy statements that make explicit a pattern of enforcement
discretion, one that would otherwise remain implicit. Even holding legal
authority constant, making that authority explicit through general policy
statements may trigger the normatively inflected political sanctions that are
characteristic of conventions.
I do not at all mean to claim that executive-constraining conventions are
necessarily desirable from a welfarist standpoint—they may or may not be.
Nor do I claim that they cannot be overridden or broken, or anything like
that. Conventions have a dimension of weight, often have implicit override
conditions, and may be more or less fragile. Indeed, part of the story is that
as the political parties have become more polarized over time, a number of
intragovernmental conventions resting on reciprocal cooperation have broken
down, and the politics of executive action have become both more legalized
and more political—in the ordinary convention-independent sense of
“political.” But I will claim that the role of conventions cannot safely be
neglected in any analysis of executive discretion.
I. EXAMPLES
Let me begin with some examples of conventions that shape and constrain
executive discretion. There are also conventions that shape and constrain the
behavior of other branches, and indeed the government as a whole, but I will
focus strictly on executive-governing conventions in the United States
constitutional order. In parliamentary systems lacking a formal and
institutional separation of executive power from other powers, of course, the
whole question of categorization would have to be approached differently.
A. Removal
I will begin with some examples of conventions surrounding the removal
of executive officials. In the Free Enterprise Fund litigation, the Supreme Court
and the lower courts treated the Commissioners of the Securities and
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Exchange Commission as though they have for-cause tenure.2 Legally
speaking, however, they simply do not. The relevant statutes say nothing about
tenure, and thus fail to override the longstanding background default principle
that for-cause tenure must be express.3 There is a limited exception in which
the Court has been willing to imply for-cause tenure for administrative officers
who are in essence mini-judges exercising purely adjudicative functions,4 but
the SEC does not fit that description. The independence of the Commissioners,
in the sense of for-cause tenure, is not based on a statute but on unwritten rules
with normative force. As one lower court put it, it is just “commonly understood”
that the Commissioners are independent. 5
Somewhat similarly, there is a powerful convention that Presidents cannot
fire the Chair of the Federal Reserve except for serious cause.6 Here, too, there
is no legal rule to that effect, but it is a universally agreed-upon rule of the
political game—agreed upon in a tacit sense.7 The most telling evidence is that
when Presidents have attempted to maneuver a Fed Chair out of office, they
have proceeded covertly and circumspectly, so as not to outrage public opinion.8
In 2007, President George W. Bush failed to renew the terms of seven
United States Attorneys, and public opinion rose up in outrage.9 Bush’s action
was indisputably within his legal power; the relevant statutes do not grant
United States Attorneys for-cause tenure, and indeed the Court ruled early
and clearly that no such tenure exists.10 Yet a network of conventions that

2 Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477 (2010). In his response
to the symposium articles, Peter Strauss makes the odd remark that “(n)either can the proposition
be considered a matter of ‘convention,’ as Professor Vermeule suggests, since Chief Justice Roberts’s
opinion holds that the PCAOB’s considerable powers are valid”—as though conventions cannot be
incorporated into judicial holdings. See Peter L. Strauss, Response, Things Left Unsaid, Questions Not
Asked, 164 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE (forthcoming 2016); infra Section II.A (discussing the adoption
of conventions as law).
3 See Vermeule, supra note 1, at 1175, 1195 (noting the convention regarding not firing SEC
Commissioners despite the lack of statutory protections).
4 See Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349, 356 (1958) (“We have not a removal for cause
involving the rectitude of a member of an adjudicatory body, nor even a suspensory removal until
the Senate could act upon it by confirming the appointment of a new Commissioner or otherwise
dealing with the matter. Judging . . . the claim that the President could remove a member of an
adjudicatory body like the War Claims Commission merely because he wanted his own appointees
on such a Commission, we are compelled to conclude that no such power is given to the President
directly by the Constitution, and none is impliedly conferred upon him by statute simply because
Congress said nothing about it.”).
5 SEC v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., 855 F.2d 677, 681 (10th Cir. 1988).
6 See Vermeule, supra note 1, at 1176-78, 1196-99 (explaining this convention).
7 See id. (discussing this convention in further detail).
8 See id. at 1198-99 (reviewing Paul Volcker’s departure from the Federal Reserve).
9 Id. at 1201.
10 See id. (“U.S. Attorneys are appointed for four-year terms, and it is clear that as a strictly legal
matter they serve at the pleasure of the President; Parsons [v. United States, 167 U.S. 324 (1897),] itself
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limited presidential control over U.S. Attorneys had grown.11 As described
by Mary Jo White, herself a former U.S. Attorney, the President may replace
the whole set en masse, at the time of a partisan change of administration, but
may not engage in selective replacement during the middle of a presidential
term.12 The rationale for the convention is rather obviously to protect the
independence of U.S. Attorneys through a form of herd immunity or safety
in numbers, preventing the President from singling out particular prosecutors
based on their decisions.13
B. Directive Power
Now let me turn to conventions governing the so-called “directive
authority,” raised by Coglianese and Firth in their article.14 Although the
scope and limits of the directive power of the President are among the most
contested issues in administrative law,15 the debates would be greatly
improved by the recognition that conventions pervasively shape and constrain
that power. The President’s legal powers of direction are substantially greater
than his actual discretion to direct, and not only because “politics” is an
additional constraint—unless we define politics, unhelpfully, to include conventions.
I return to the definitional issues shortly, but let me offer some examples.
There is a clear and powerful convention that restricts presidential
direction of agency adjudication, especially in formal proceedings.16 What
makes this convention particularly striking is that it governs even where the
department head, herself subject to presidential direction, would otherwise

involved a federal district attorney, and the Court held that a statutory term of years does not, as a matter
of statutory interpretation, immunize the office-holder from at-will discharge by the President.”).
11 See id. at 1201-02 (describing the conventions).
12 See Julie Scelfo, Former U.S. Atty. Says Independence Threatened, NEWSWEEK (Mar. 14, 2007,
8:00 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/former-us-atty-says-independence-threatened-96115 [https://
perma.cc/KYY8-ASDC] (“Essentially, all U.S. attorneys, as political appointees, are expected to be
replaced when the party changes. . . . It is an entirely different matter when replacement of the U.S.
attorneys are [sic] made during the same administration. . . . [Replacement in the middle of a
President’s term,] in my experience and to my knowledge, is quite unprecedented.”).
13 See Vermeule, supra note 1, at 1203 (“The key distinction is between wholesale partisan
replacement and retail replacement, a distinction that supporters of the convention justify as
preventing Presidents or their underlings from pressuring prosecutors to bring particular, politically
charged cases.”).
14 Cary Coglianese & Kristin Firth, Separation of Powers Legitimacy: An Empirical Inquiry into
Norms About Executive Power, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1869, 1871 (2016).
15 See id. at 1875-76 (“One side of this debate treats the President’s directive authority as
virtually unconstrained, whether as a matter of constitutional law (the unitary executive theory) or
as a matter of statutory presumption. . . . The other side of the debate holds that, even absent a
specific statutory prohibition, presidential authority over administrators is constrained in that the
President cannot make decisions that have been entrusted by Congress to administrators.”).
16 See Vermeule, supra note 1, at 1211-14 (analyzing this convention).
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have legal authority to intervene. As Elena Kagan put it, “The only mode of
administrative action from which [President] Clinton shrank was
adjudication. At no time in his tenure did he attempt publicly to exercise the
powers that a department head possesses over an agency’s on-the-record
determinations.”17 The convention, then, is definitely a constraint on the
directive power of the President as President.
Many executive-branch lawyers have spoken of unwritten conventions
protecting the independence of the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC).18 In the
most high-minded version of this account, OLC is supposed to give the
President entirely independent legal advice and to act as an impartial legal
arbiter in interagency jurisdictional disputes; the President would violate
convention by directing OLC to give one opinion or another.19 There is good
reason to think that the high-minded picture is partly aspirational, although
there have been important cases in which OLC did actually contradict the
President’s wishes.20 It is not that the conventions are unreal, but they have
probably weakened over time, and were always subject to bending or breaking
when political pressure became sufficiently great.21
In a different example, Michael Livermore and Ricky Revesz discern a
tradition of appointing relatively independent voices to the position of Office
of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) Administrator, and opine that
the tradition would likely be difficult to break.22 The cash value of this
tradition seems to be that the OIRA Administrator has leeway to make
regulatory policy and to apply the cost–benefit framework of relevant
executive orders, without fear or favor.23 Although Livermore and Revesz
phrase the “tradition” in terms of appointment, it would seem, a fortiori, that
replacing an OIRA Administrator on openly political grounds would
probably be even more likely to provoke convention-based political sanctions.

17
18
19
20

Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2306 (2001) (emphasis added).
See Vermeule, supra note 1, at 1209-11 (discussing the conventions pertaining to the OLC).
See id. at 1209 (describing the supposed role of the OLC under this view).
See Trevor W. Morrison, Stare Decisis in the Office of Legal Counsel, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1448,
1457 n.36 (2010) (discussing impoundment of Congressional appropriations and the line-item veto,
among other examples).
21 See Daphna Renan, The Law Presidents Make 6-19, 37-39 (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with author).
22 Michael A. Livermore & Richard L. Revesz, Can Executive Review Help Prevent Capture?, in
PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE: SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE AND HOW TO LIMIT IT
420, 421 (Daniel Carpenter & David Moss eds., 2014).
23 See Vermeule, supra note 1, at 1205-06 (describing the role of the OIRA Administrator).
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II. CONVENTIONS AS THE THIRD BOUND
A. Neither Law Nor Politics
Whatever the details, the relevant point for our purposes is that
conventions are a tertium quid, neither law nor politics, at least not necessarily
so. They are not “law,” or not necessarily “law.” The classical British view was
that law and conventions are entirely distinct; “law” was by definition
enforceable in court, whereas conventions were not. The more nuanced
modern view in the Commonwealth is that although conventions may not be
enforced in court, they may be “recognized” and used as an aid to interpreting
statutes or deciding other legal questions. In our system, the “law” may or
may not be enforceable in court, and although it is possible for legal
rulemakers to adopt conventions as legal rules, they do not have to be so
adopted, so conventions may or may not be enforced in court.24
When will conventions be adopted as law? All else equal, courts are more
likely to read conventions into open-ended or ambiguous texts with unclear
originalist referents. As Justice Jackson urged, “Usage may sometimes impart
changed content to constitutional generalities, such as ‘due process of law,’ ‘equal
protection,’ or ‘commerce among the states.’”25 And of course Justice Frankfurter
suggested that custom may provide a “gloss” on the executive power.26
The articles by Patricia Bellia, on the one hand, and by Jack Goldsmith
and John Manning, on the other, persuade me that the Faithful Execution
Clause is fertile ground for such an approach.27 Consider a set of cases: (1) the
Youngstown case,28 in which the President claimed inherent power to seize and
operate steel mills necessary for war production; (2) In re Debs,29 which
recognized inherent executive power to obtain an injunction against violent
labor strikes; (3) Cunningham v. Neagle,30 which upheld the power of a United
States Marshal to kill a man who posed an imminent threat to a Supreme
Court Justice; and (4) Zivotofsky II,31 in which the Court found inherent
presidential power to recognize foreign governments. The Court invalidated

24
25
26

For the details, see generally Adrian Vermeule, Conventions in Court, 38 DUBLIN L.J. 283 (2015).
Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214, 233 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610-11 (1952) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring). For an outstanding analytic taxonomy of gloss and its rationales, see Curtis A.
Bradley, Doing Gloss, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016).
27 Patricia L. Bellia, Faithful Execution and Enforcement Discretion, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1753 (2016);
Jack Goldsmith & John F. Manning, The Protean Take Care Clause, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1835 (2016).
28 Youngstown, 343 U.S. 579.
29 158 U.S. 564 (1895).
30 135 U.S. 1 (1890).
31 Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076 (2015).
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executive action in the first but sustained it in the other three.32 In the last, it
went so far as to invalidate a contrary federal statute as an invasion of
executive power that is not only inherent but exclusive.33 There is no obvious
or even nonobvious set of legal distinctions that makes these cases line up
together, although with enough work, one could doubtless construct some
sort of theory. But the real engine of the decisions is a tacit appeal to a
widespread conventional sense of the appropriate functions of government
and the Executive in particular. Our confidence that the Executive must have
the constitutional power to kill an assassin gunning for a Supreme Court
Justice is pre-theoretical and persists undiminished even in the face of
theoretical or legal uncertainty. It is a “can’t help” shared by almost everyone
in the relevant community. More recently, and more explicitly, the Free
Enterprise Fund decision shows the Court incorporating conventions of SEC
independence into its treatment of the Faithful Execution Clause and other
constitutional clauses bearing on executive power.34
On the other side, conventions are not “politics” either. More accurately,
they may or may not be a species of “politics,” depending on what we mean.
The notion of “politics” is fatally ambiguous. It includes at least two critically
different subcategories: ordinary contingent politics and moralized politics,

32 See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 587 (“Nor can the seizure order be sustained because of the several
constitutional provisions that grant executive power to the President.”); see also Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. at
2094 (“[T]he power to recognize foreign states resides in the President alone . . . .”); Debs, 158 U.S. at
599 (“[W]e hold . . . that in the exercise of those powers it is competent for the nation to remove all
obstructions upon highways, natural or artificial, to the passage of interstate commerce or the carrying
of the mail; that while it may be competent for the government (through the executive branch and in
the use of the entire executive power of the nation) to forcibly remove all such obstructions, it is equally
within its competency to appeal to the civil courts for an inquiry and determination as to the existence
and character of any alleged obstructions, and if such are found to exist, or threaten to occur, to invoke
the powers of those courts to remove or restrain such obstructions . . . .”); Neagle, 135 U.S. at 67, 75-76
(“We cannot doubt the power of the President to take measures for the protection of a judge of one of
the courts of the United States, who, while in the discharge of the duties of his office, is threatened
with a personal attack which may probably result in his death . . . . [I]n the protection of the person
and the life of Mr. Justice Field while in the discharge of his official duties, Neagle was authorized to
resist the attack of Terry upon him; . . . that in taking the life of Terry, under the circumstances, he was
acting under the authority of the law of the United States, and was justified in so doing; and that he is
not liable to answer in the courts of California on account of his part in that transaction.”).
33 See Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. at 2096 (“To allow Congress to control the President’s
communication in the context of a formal recognition determination is to allow Congress to exercise
that exclusive power itself. As a result, the statute is unconstitutional.”).
34 See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 496-97 (2010) (“This
novel structure does not merely add to the Board’s independence, but transforms it. . . . Without the
ability to oversee the Board, or to attribute the Board’s failings to those whom he can oversee, the
President is no longer the judge of the Board’s conduct. He is not the one who decides whether Board
members are abusing their offices or neglecting their duties. He can neither ensure that the laws are
faithfully executed, nor be held responsible for a Board member’s breach of faith.”).
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in which there are widely shared unwritten rules of the political game.35 Such
rules are founded on a sense of obligation, and a public act violating the rules
provokes retaliatory sanctions or moralized outrage.36
Imagine the political reaction to two different proposals by a sitting
President: (1) top marginal tax rates should go down, or (2) the stars and
stripes on the U.S. flag should be replaced by an Apple logo, conditional on
an enormous donation by Apple to the U.S. Treasury. Although both
proposals would suffer objections from “public opinion,” the nature of the
relevant “politics” would be very different. In the second case, even to make
the proposal would violate a convention against the sale of public symbols,
and would thus provoke outrage, not merely policy opposition. Semantically,
we can say that conventions are a subspecies of politics, but at a minimum,
conventions are a distinctive type of politics. I will reserve the label “politics”
for contingent quotidian politics, as in the example of top marginal rates.
B. Intragovernmental Versus Extragovernmental Conventions
It follows that conventions may, but need not, be based upon the force of
“public opinion.” Michael Gerhardt’s article usefully distinguishes publicly
salient issues from low-visibility issues.37 Some conventions are indeed
enforced by the threat of moralized outrage on the part of the diffuse mass of
public opinion; let us call those extragovernmental conventions.38 Other
conventions are enforced by the credible threat of retaliation from the other
political party, another branch of the government, or some other institutional
actor, even as to issues about which the general public is largely oblivious.39
The usual case involves a tit-for-tat mechanism, like cooperation between
government actors in an indefinitely iterated prisoners’ dilemma or assurance
game.40 We might call those intragovernmental conventions.
In a further distinction, intragovernmental conventions can be cross-party
or intraparty. An example of the latter is the Hastert Rule. “[F]or some period
of time starting in the 1990s, the Republican Party in the House of
35
36
37

See Vermeule, supra note 1, at 1186-94 (describing these two categories).
See id. (discussing the consequences of breaching either a “thin” or a “thick” obligation).
See Michael J. Gerhardt, Constitutional Arrogance, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1649, 1675 (2016)
(“Public opinion matters most in presidential calculations on matters of great political salience, but
that is only one factor that can influence Presidents.”).
38 See Vermeule, supra note 1, at 1186 (noting “the threat of political backlash from the public,
possibly resulting in an electoral defeat”).
39 See id. at 1188 (using as examples senatorial courtesy over appointments, the filibuster rule,
and pairing of absent senators in the United States and the “convention that incoming governments
of a given party do not disclose to the public the confidential internal documents and memoranda
of the other party” in the United Kingdom).
40 See, e.g., id. at 1187-89 (discussing the applicability of the prisoners’ dilemma to these conventions).
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Representatives, when it controlled the House, followed an internal
convention called the ‘Hastert Rule,’” under which “no legislation would be
approved unless a majority of the majority party voted in favor.”41 “The
convention thus excluded approval by a majority comprising the minority
party plus a minority of the majority party.”42 The rule has recently been more
honored in the breach than in the observance.43
Intragovernmental conventions are sociologically vulnerable. They tend
to break down when, for external political and sociological reasons, new actors
come on the scene who will not play by the preexisting rules. In the United
Kingdom, a number of conventions suddenly broke down in the 1920s, in large
part because of an influx into Parliament of members from new social classes,
who were not in any long-term reciprocity relationship with the existing
elites, or who rejected the existence of relevant conventions in the first place.44
Our own version of this is the recent breakdown of cooperation between
the Democratic and Republican parties over Senate norms, especially
presidential appointments, particularly recess appointments, that Gerhardt
referred to in his article.45 A large part of this story is the influx into the
Republican Party of an insurgent element, opposed to the establishment
element, which has no interest in long-run reciprocal cooperation with
establishment Democrats.46
When these Senate conventions break down, Presidents end up relying
on increasingly aggressive claims of legal authority.47 This reliance is not just
or not mainly a story of presidential aggrandizement, although it is partly
that. It is also, counterintuitively, a symptom of presidential weakness. The
breakdown of implicit conventions and understandings across parties and

41
42
43

Vermeule, supra note 24, at 286.
Id.
See, e.g., House Votes Violating the “Hastert Rule,” N.Y. TIMES, http://politics.nytimes.com/
congress/votes/house/hastert-rule [https://perma.cc/AN7P-SF9W] (listing the “[v]otes that passed
without the support of a majority of the majority party in the House”).
44 See generally Richard Toye, ‘Perfectly Parliamentary’? The Labour Party and the House of
Commons in the Inter-War Years, 24 TWENTIETH CENTURY BRIT. HIST. 1 (2014) (discussing the
Labour Party of the 1920s).
45 See Gerhardt, supra note 37, at 1658-61 (discussing developments in the practice of recess
appointments).
46 See Raf Sanchez, Tea Party Victory Dashes Barack Obama’s Lingering Hopes for Compromise with
Republicans, TELEGRAPH (June 11, 2014, 7:42 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/
republicans/10893084/Tea-Party-victory-dashes-Barack-Obamas-lingering-hopes-for-compromisewith-Republicans.html [https://perma.cc/3QD7-EGV3] (reporting on the Tea Party’s electoral
successes in the 2014 Republican Party primary elections and what it would mean for cooperation
with the Democrats).
47 See David E. Pozen, Self-Help and the Separation of Powers, 124 YALE L.J. 2, 4-5 (2014)
(highlighting the recent examples of recess appointments, changes to immigration enforcement, and
the execution of the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001).
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across branches necessitates more formal or visible presidential aggression.48
One immediate consequence is the possibility of tit-for-tat “self-defense”
retaliation by institutions or parties, in various settings.49
For another example of the consequences that result when conventions
break down, let me quote from Nicholas Bagley’s article:
The Obama Administration’s willingness to bend the law [in the ACA
financing controversy] is to some extent understandable. Congress’s refusal to
meet the financial obligations that it assumed in prior legislation is a breach of
a longstanding convention that Congress will appropriate the money to satisfy
those obligations. . . . [The Administration’s] decision nonetheless sets a
troubling precedent for future battles over the appropriations power. . . . It’s
impossible to anticipate the full consequences of weakening the legislature’s
power of the purse. . . .50

Bagley’s sketch identifies not only the tit-for-tat structure of the
Administration’s position, but also the long-run effects of retaliation on the
informal precedents that structure executive–legislative relations.
We might well imagine, after the controversy that Bagley identifies, that a
new set of litigated cases over the scope and limits of legislative appropriations
will arise. This highlights another consequence of the breakdown of
conventions: law substitutes imperfectly for regulation-by-convention, as
behavior that would have remained extrajudicial becomes legalized and
litigated. The most obvious example is the recess appointments case, NLRB v.
Noel Canning,51 which arose from the breakdown of tacit conventional
constraints on the abuse of the filibuster for appointments and an aggressive
tit-for-tat reaction from the presidency. I believe that Zivotofsky II52 is also an
example of this effect. In an earlier era, conventions of interbranch comity
would have prevented the full-bore constitutional showdown from producing a
full merits decision by the Court.
As both of these decisions show, a breakdown in conventions can end up
increasing presidential power at the expense of Congress. Zivotofsky II, the
first case to squarely invalidate a statute on exclusive executive power grounds

48 See id. at 8 (“[M]any of the most pointed ways in which Congress and the President challenge
one another can plausibly and profitably be modeled as self-help rather than self-aggrandizement, as efforts
to enforce constitutional settlements rather than to circumvent them.” (emphasis added)).
49 On the structure of such arguments, see generally N.W. Barber, Self-Defence for Institutions,
72 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 558 (2013) and Pozen, supra note 47.
50 Nicholas Bagley, Legal Limits and the Implementation of the Affordable Care Act, 164 U. PA. L.
REV. 1715, 1734-35 (2016).
51 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014).
52 Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076 (2015).
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under Category III of Jackson’s Youngstown concurrence,53 was one of the
presidency’s greatest victories in court. Noel Canning invalidated the
particular appointments at issue, but announced a constitutional framework
that explicitly recognized a more expansive recess appointment power than
the Administration’s opponents favored.54 In that sense Noel Canning was a
victory for the presidency, if not for President Obama.55 In both cases, to the
extent that the Administration’s opponents decided to breach conventions
and take their chances in court out of a fear of excessive executive power, the
long-run result was perverse and self-defeating.
C. Conventions About Doing Things Versus Conventions About Saying Things
Finally, let me turn to another distinction which I believe has been
systematically overlooked in debates over executive enforcement discretion: the
distinction between conventions about doing things, on the one hand, and
conventions about saying things, on the other. Conventions about doing things,
as discussed above, are obvious.56 However, there are also conventions regulating
speech acts. There exists a category of executive discretion such that the
Executive may do things without violating any law or convention, but will violate
a convention, triggering political backlash or public outrage, if the Executive
makes explicit that he or she is doing those things. Some things may be done, but
may not be talked about. Making things explicit may be a separate violation.
There is an analogy here to the Victorian Compromise, in which “vice”
was tolerated so long as it was kept out of sight and not discussed.57 The
Victorian Compromise was, in part, a convention—more accurately a network
or structure of conventions—shaping the discretion of executive enforcers,
such as police.58 Closer to our time, David Strauss’s fascinating unpublished
53 See id. at 2084, 2096 (noting that “[b]ecause the President’s refusal to implement § 214(d)
falls into Justice Jackson’s third category, his claim must be ‘scrutinized with caution,’ and he may
rely solely on powers the Constitution grants to him alone,” and later declaring the statute
unconstitutional); see also Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring) (“When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or
implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own
constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter.”).
54 See Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2577 (“We thus hold that the Constitution empowers the President
to fill any existing vacancy during any recess—intra-session or inter-session—of sufficient length.”).
55 See id. at 2557 (“[T]he Senate was in the midst of a 3-day recess. Three days is too short a
time to bring a recess within the scope of the Clause. Thus we conclude that the President lacked
the power to make the recess appointments here at issue.”).
56 See supra Sections I.A–B.
57 See Vermeule, supra note 1, at 1199 (defining “Victorian Compromise” as “in effect forcing
those who would test their limits, or even violate them, to proceed on the quiet, so as not to trigger
blaming, shaming, retaliation, electoral backlash, or other norm-enforcing sanctions”).
58 See, e.g., Joshua C. Tate, Gambling, Commodity Speculation, and the “Victorian Compromise,” 19
YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 97, 98-99 (“So long as the general social fabric was preserved, it did not
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paper, Do It But Don’t Tell Me,59 recounts a number of areas in which executive
agents may do (so far as conventions are concerned) what they may not
discuss; the obvious example is torture of suspected terrorists, which the
American public is seemingly willing to tolerate so long as it is not done
openly.60 Let me also offer, however, some less dramatic examples.
Bagley’s article suggests the interesting hypothesis that tit-for-tat
retaliation is subject to a convention against saying things.61 In other words, the
President cannot openly cite tit-for-tat as a rationale, even if it is otherwise
constitutionally legitimate, in a second-best sense, to engage in tit-for-tat
behavior, necessitated by constitutional breaches by other actors. Bagley quite
properly does not appear to be claiming that the hypothesis is actually true,
only that it is sufficiently plausible to bear investigation.62 One would have to
examine many cases more systematically to know whether it is in fact true.
Nonetheless, it is a conceptually interesting possibility.
Conventions against saying things regulate and prohibit avowed partisanship.
There is no general norm against partisan behavior in the administrative state,
nor could there be. Such behavior is everywhere. However, there is certainly a
separate and independent norm against partisan justifications for partisan
behavior. When the House Majority Leader Kevin McCarthy openly admitted
that the Benghazi investigation of Hillary Clinton was part of a Republican
strategy to “fight and win,” he was widely excoriated by both parties and his
bid for Speaker of the House was derailed.63 The resulting norm is complicated
and conflicted. Ideally, we want officials to act based on nonpartisan reasons;
non-ideally, we know that often they do not, and as a second best, we want them
at least not to talk about it openly. If there is a rationale for that constraint, it
is the “civilizing force of hypocrisy”:64 the inability to give openly partisan
matter if vice continued to exist beneath the surface . . . . [T]he worst forms of vice were dealt with
harshly, while less dangerous vices were allowed to go unpunished.”).
59 David A. Strauss, Do It But Don’t Tell Me (Apr. 5, 2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with author).
60 See id. at 12-16 (analyzing this example).
61 See Bagley, supra note 50, at 1748-49 (“Politicians believe—with good reason—that the
American public cares about the law and will punish a President who flouts it. Even if a limited
right to self-help were to become a recognized, legitimate feature of the separation of powers, the
President will likely hesitate before exercising that right, just as he hesitates before exercising his
acknowledged right to veto a piece of legislation. Political repercussions thus offer a plausible
mechanism for assuring that self-help stays within tolerable bounds.” (footnote omitted)).
62 See id. at 1748-51 (acknowledging the arguments in favor of and against the presidential use
of self-help and the potential for evidence to point in either direction).
63 See E.J. Dionne Jr., Kevin McCarthy’s Truthful Gaffe on Benghazi, WASH. POST (Sept. 30,
2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/kevin-mccarthys-truthful-gaffe/2015/09/30/f12a9fac67a8-11e5-8325-a42b5a459b1e_story.html [https://perma.cc/U8BP-RUYZ] (discussing this situation).
64 See Publicity, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Jan. 12, 2005), http://plato.stanford.edu/
entries/publicity/ [https://perma.cc/8RRL-AJQS] (citing to Jon Elster’s idea that “[t]he presence of
a public makes it especially hard to appear motivated merely by self-interest” and that “[i]n general,
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justifications in a transparent public setting may actually constrain behavior, at
least at the edges, if there is no plausible public-spirited justification available
as a pretext.65 Whether or not hypocrisy in fact acts as a civilizing force,
however, it is unlikely that such a sophisticated rationale explains the genesis
of the convention. Rather, the norm arises because people who will tolerate
objectionable behavior if it is decorously concealed will become uncomfortable,
and then outraged, if they are forced to confront it directly.66
The idea of conventions against making things explicit may help us
understand a range of current controversies over enforcement discretion. I
refer to a category that includes the white-hot debate over immigration
enforcement discretion, currently being litigated; the debate over presidential
signing statements with no independent legal force, discussed in the article
by Christopher Yoo;67 and Nick Bagley’s observation on the announced delay
of the employer mandates under the Affordable Care Act (ACA):
If the Administration wished to deprioritize enforcement, it could have
kept quiet about its plans. The regulated community would still have felt
obliged to comply even if the likelihood of enforcement was low. For policy
reasons, however, the Administration wanted to relieve employers and health
plans of certain obligations. The Administration thus used the public
announcements of its nonenforcement policies to encourage the regulated
community to disregard provisions of the ACA.68

These examples have a common structure. Imagine a set of executive
enforcement decisions over an array of cases, A, B, and C. The enforcement
decisions are made either (1) on a case-by-case basis, under an implicit or tacit
policy; or (2) on an aggregate basis, under an explicit policy statement or set
of enforcement guidelines. For clarity, let us hold all outcomes constant. We
will assume, in other words, that A, B, and C are treated exactly the same way
under both regimes. The same people are or are not deported, the same
employers are or are not relieved of ACA obligations, and so on. I will put
aside the objection, heard in many contexts, that approach (2) “makes law.”
As a matter of administrative law, this is a red herring because there is nothing
binding about the prospective announcement of how the Executive intends
this civilizing force of hypocrisy is a desirable effect of publicity” (quoting JON ELSTER, Deliberation
and Constitution Making, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 97, 111 (1998))).
65 See id. (“The public is meant to hold normative expectations regarding what representatives
are supposed to say. One of these expectations is that any overt reference to mere self-interest in
the course of justifying their position would be seen as unacceptable . . . .” (footnote omitted)).
66 Cf. Strauss, supra note 59, at 23-26 (arguing that this “moral ambivalence” may be an
explanation for the “do it but don’t tell me” regime).
67 Christopher S. Yoo, Presidential Signing Statements: A New Perspective, 164 U. PA. L. REV.
1801 (2016).
68 Bagley, supra note 50, at 1723.
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to exercise discretion in a class of cases. They are best understood as “general
statements of policy” under section 553(b)(3)(A) of the Administrative
Procedure Act, and thus do not count as binding agency rules that must go
through the process of notice and comment.69 Were the other party to take
the presidency, all of these policies could be changed with a stroke of the pen.
Given this structure, defenders of interpretive rules, of general policy
statements in the immigration context, and so on argue that making
enforcement guidelines explicit is better, from the standpoint of transparency,
predictability, and the rule of law.70 Whether or not that view is ultimately
correct, it must grapple with a major complication: making enforcement
policy explicit may sometimes bump up against conventions that require
keeping discretion subterranean. Relevant audiences will tolerate exercises of
enforcement discretion that they are dimly aware are going on, but do not
want that discretion to be made explicit and elevated to the level of a policy.71
I do not claim that there is in fact such a convention in any one of the areas I
have mentioned, let alone every one of them. I suggest only that it bears
considering whether the strong reaction to, for example, the Obama
Administration’s immigration enforcement policy statements cannot be
explained solely by their content, but must also be explained with reference
to the very fact that the Administration has made them explicit. A tacit
pattern of enforcement behavior yielding all the same outcomes, across an
array of cases, would be a very different matter.
Once again, if such conventions against making things explicit do exist in
a given area, it is a separate question whether their existence is good or bad
from the standpoint of social welfare. It is also a complicated question. The
principal effect of such conventions is to inhibit transparency, which has
downsides as well as upsides; the relative costs and benefits of transparency
are highly contextual and not susceptible to glib generalities.72 If the
“civilizing force of hypocrisy” exists,73 then inhibiting transparency may have
substantive effects in some cases, changing not only what may be said but
what may be done. My suggestion is not normative, but analytic: the relevant
debates over executive enforcement discretion and policy statements are
incomplete, and may often be misguided, if participants fail to address the
role of conventions.
69 Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 197 (1993).
70 See, e.g., Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law Redux,
125 YALE L.J. 104, 174-75 (2015) (making this argument).
71 See generally Strauss, supra note 59.
72 For an attempt to consider all relevant costs and benefits under an array of conditions, see
generally ADRIAN VERMEULE, MECHANISMS OF DEMOCRACY: INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN WRIT
SMALL (2007).
73 Publicity, supra note 64.
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CONCLUSION
Legal analysts of executive power have to think about more than “law”
and “politics”—using the latter term in a thin sense to refer to the shifting
contingencies of partisan conflict over first-order policies. Conventions,
unwritten rules of the political game, including conventions against saying
things, shape and constrain executive discretion as well. To the extent that
one believes, as I do, that law is less constraining on the Executive than many
lawyers believe, conventions are relatively more important than would
otherwise be the case.
This is not to say that the importance of conventions is necessarily
increasing over time. As we have seen, the increasing breakdown of
intragovernmental conventions of reciprocal cooperation between the parties,
and hence between the President and the Senate under conditions of divided
government, has brought about the explicit legalization and juridification of a
number of executive-power questions that were previously within the domain
of convention. Yet, new conventions will eventually arise and stabilize, and in
any event, there remains a robust set of conventions—surrounding removal,
directive power, and enforcement policy—that places a third bound on
executive discretion.
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